The purpose of this paper is to see whether and how G-10 banks have complied with the 1988 Basel Capital Accord. The interest of this study lies in the fact that the standardized approach of the New Basel Accord is similar to the 1988 agreement. However, very little is known about the reaction of non-US banks to the imposition of fixed minimum capital requirements. Building on previous studies, this paper uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze adjustments in capital and portfolio risk at banks from G-10 countries over the period 1988-95. The results suggest that banks close to the Basel standards have generally increased their capital adequacy ratios without any offsetting increases in portfolio risk. In addition, a negative correlation is found between changes in capital and risk ratios suggesting that, everything else being equal, the capital build-up of the early 1990s was associated with a decrease in the credit risk-taking of G-10 banks.
Introduction
One of the major developments undergone by the banking industry over recent years has been the worldwide implementation of the so-called Basel Accord that sets minimum capital standards for internationally active banks. The Basel guidelines were originally adopted by the central banking authorities from 12 countries (all G-10 countries plus Luxembourg and Switzerland) in July 1988. Their implementation started in 1989 and was completed 4 years later, in 1993. The purpose of the Accord was twofold. First, it aimed at creating a level playing field among banks by raising capital ratios, which were generally perceived as too low in many countries. Second, and linked to this, it aimed at promoting financial stability by adopting a relatively simple approach to credit risk with the potential to distort incentives for bank risk-taking.
Fifteen years after the adoption of the Basel Accord and whilst new regulatory guidelines are being designed, it is fair to say that empirical research has failed to answer the following questions: was the 1988 agreement effective in raising capital ratios among banking institutions falling below the minimum requirements? How did banks respond to the capital adequacy rules, i.e. did they increase their level of capital, forgo risky projects or sell off assets? Did the new guidelines induce banks to modify the credit risk of their portfolio and if so, to which risk categories did they reallocate their assets? Analysis of how G-10 banks have responded to the 1988 risk-based standards is of course crucial if one wants to gain insight into the likely implications of the New Basel Capital Accord.
The lack of answers to the questions raised above is largely due to the limited amount of data on capital levels and risky assets of G-10 banks. Indeed, these data are mainly confidential or hard to obtain on a standardized cross-country basis. Most studies focus on the US, while evidence has remained scarce for other countries that were part of the Accord.
Therefore, an important contribution of this paper is to shed further light on the impact of the 1988 Basel Accord using data from 7 different countries: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US. More precisely, I extend the simultaneous equations model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to a multi-country setting in order to analyze the relationship between changes in capital ratios and credit risk at the G-10 level. The model also allows for cross-country comparisons of undercapitalized banks' behavior towards capital and risk.
The results show that changes in the capital and credit risk ratios of G-10 banks were negatively related over the 1988-95 period. In addition, the findings indicate that banks close to the Basel minimum requirements increased their capital ratios (except in France and Italy), whereas there is only weak evidence for a rise in their credit risk-taking. All in all, this suggests that the beginning of the 1990s was a period of increased stability for the G-10 banking industry.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature dealing with the effects of capital requirements on banks' portfolio risk, in the context of the Basel Accord. Section 3 presents the data used in this study, while section 4 outlines the empirical methodology. Results are discussed in section 5 and some conclusions are drawn in section 6.
Bank capital regulation and its impact on banks' risk-taking in theory and in practice

Theoretical review
The main justification for regulating bank capital is the need to avoid the risk-shifting incentive generated by improperly priced deposit insurance. Indeed, although it may promote financial stability in the short-run, risk-insensitive deposit insurance tends to reduce banks' incentives to maintain adequate capital and may thus endanger stability in the long-run. The ability of capital standards to successfully eliminate this "moral hazard" problem, thereby reinforcing the effect of a higher capital ratio on default risk, has been at the heart of a theoretical debate for more than 20 years.
A first strand of the literature focuses on utility-maximizing banks using the portfolio approach of Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee (1974) . In this framework, Koehn and Santomero (1980) show that the introduction of higher leverage ratios will lead banks to shift their portfolio to riskier assets and that the reshuffling effect will be larger for institutions which initially held relatively more risky assets per unit of capital. This effect occurs because flat requirements restrict the banks' risk-return frontier, which leads them to compensate the loss in utility from the upper limit on leverage with the choice of a riskier portfolio. One way to eliminate the risk-shifting incentive is to require banks to meet risk-related capital ratios, as suggested by Kim and Santomero (1988) .
These conclusions have been questioned on several grounds. Using an option model, Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) find that higher capital requirements reduce the incentives for a value-maximizing bank to increase asset risk. They contend that the utility-maximization framework, which reaches opposite conclusions, is inappropriate because it does not adequately describe the bank's investment opportunity set by neglecting the option value of deposit insurance and the possibility of bank failure. Within the same modeling framework, Gennotte and Pyle (1991) relax the assumption that banks invest in zero net present value assets and find that there are now plausible situations in which an increase in capital requirements results in an increase of asset risk.
The portfolio approach is used again by Rochet (1992) who shows that when the limited liability of banks is taken into account, insufficiently capitalized banks may exhibit riskloving behavior even if regulation makes use of a risk-related capital ratio. As a consequence, it may be necessary to impose an additional requirement, in the form of a minimum capital level.
More recently, Blum (1999) also finds that capital regulation may increase banks' riskiness but in a dynamic framework. Using a two-period model, he shows that an intertemporal effect has to be considered in addition to the standard negative effect of capital regulation on credit risk. If banks find it too costly to raise additional equity to meet new capital requirements tomorrow or are unable to do so, they will increase risk today. This second effect will reinforce the well-known risk-shifting incentive due to the reduction in profits.
In short, economic theory is unclear on whether imposing harsher capital requirements leads banks to increase or decrease the risk structure of their asset portfolio. Answering this issue is important as the probability of default of a bank depends positively on its leverage and on its portfolio risk. If capital requirements increase asset risk, their net effect on the probability of bankruptcy, hence on financial distress, will be ambiguous. where bucket 1 consists of assets with zero default risk (e.g. cash, government bonds / securities), bucket 2 of assets with a low rate of default (e.g. loans to OECD banks), bucket 3 of medium-risk assets (essentially residential mortgage loans) and the remaining assets (in particular loans to non-banks) fall into bucket 4. The denominator of both capital adequacy ratios thus represents the accounting value of banks' assets adjusted for their individual risk.
The tier 1 ratio and the total capital ratio differ by their numerator. The numerator of the former ratio consists only of tier 1 capital while the numerator of the latter ratio includes both tier 1 and tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital, also called "core capital", consists mainly of stockholder equity capital and disclosed reserves whereas tier 2 capital or "supplementary capital" includes elements like undisclosed reserves and subordinated term debt instruments (provided that their original fixed term to maturity does exceed five years). The difference between tier 1 and tier 2 capital thus reflects the degree to which capital is explicit or permanent. Total capital is the sum of tier 1 and tier 2 capital.
The 1988 capital adequacy guidelines require banks to have a tier 1 ratio of at least 4% and a total capital ratio of at least 8% with the contribution of tier 2 capital to total capital not exceeding 50%, i.e., the following inequalities must hold:
Total capital ratio = Total capital / RWA = (Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital) / RWA ≥ 0.08 [3] Tier 1 capital ≥ Tier 2 capital
The regulation also limits general loan-loss reserves and subordinated debt that can be eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital (see Appendix 1). The implementation of the Basel guidelines in G-10 countries occurred in two steps. Interim standards of 7.25% for the total capital ratio and 3.25% for the tier 1 ratio had to be met by the end of 1990, whereas full compliance with the definitive standards was expected by year-end 1992.
Banks that wish to raise their capital adequacy ratio (either to obey the minimum requirements or for other non-regulatory reasons) can use three types of balance-sheet adjustments. They can increase their capital level (depending on the regulatory ratio concerned, this can be done in several ways), decrease their risk-weighted assets as a proportion of total assets and / or decrease their total assets. This is summarized in equation
[5], which decomposes the growth rate of the capital adequacy ratio into three terms: the growth rate of capital, the growth rate of the credit risk ratio and the growth rate of assets -a proof is given in Appendix 2:
where CAR = K / RWA = capital adequacy ratio (tier 1 ratio or total capital ratio) K = capital (tier 1 capital or total capital) RISK = RWA / A = credit risk ratio A = total assets t denotes time From equation [5] , it can be seen that a (mandatory) increase in the capital adequacy ratio does not prevent banks from raising the credit risk of their portfolio provided that the growth rate of the credit risk ratio is lower than the growth rate of capital. 4 Thus, the Basel Accord, which aimed at imposing a higher capital buffer against insolvency, may well have encouraged banks to take on more credit risk, thereby having an ambiguous effect on their probability of failure.
In the remainder of the paper, I focus on the relationship between changes in capital and risk ratios. 5 Furthermore, I analyze the behavior of banks which are close to the minimum capital requirements, as they can be reasonably expected to have had a stronger and faster response to the Basel Accord than better capitalized institutions.
Review of the related empirical literature
The main papers that investigated the impact of the Basel capital requirements on banks' credit risk-taking are listed in Table 1 . With the exception of Ediz et al. (1998) , all use the simultaneous equations approach that is described in section 4. This modeling framework allows to compare the behavior of undercapitalized and adequately capitalized banks with respect to changes in capital and risk ratios and to see whether these changes are related.
(insert Table 1 here)
The studies surveyed in Jacques (1997, 2001 ) to the Basel Accord as opposed to FDICIA, as US banks' behavior is likely to have been affected by both regulations over the period that they consider. However, this is not a too big problem to the extent that one is interested in the effects of capital regulation in a broad sense. The study by Jacques and Nigro (1997) deals exclusively with the consequences of the Basel Accord, as it concentrates on the years 1990-91, i.e. the period before FDICIA was passed. However, the very small number of undercapitalized institutions in Jacques and
Nigro's sample -less than 2% of the total number of banks -may reduce the reliability of some of their estimates.
Two papers present some non-US evidence regarding the relationship between capital ratios and credit risk. Ediz et al. (1998) banks adjust their capital levels each year by more than the difference between the current level and the target they have in mind, which means that banks overshoot the target (and by a higher amount each year). The study by Rime (2001) is interesting because it provides the first application of the simultaneous-equations model reviewed in section 4 to non-US banks.
However, Rime adopts the PCA regulatory classification to measure regulatory pressure on Swiss banks, which might be inappropriate given that the additional requirements set by PCA have not been adopted formally by any other country besides the US. Finally, a paper by Sheldon (1996) -not listed in Table 1 -looks at the risk effects of capital adequacy on eleven G-10 countries using an option-pricing framework. Sheldon's main result is that the Basel Accord did not have a risk-increasing impact on banks' portfolio but is a bit difficult to interpret, as he is does not control for regulatory and non-regulatory influences.
Moreover, his sample is not always representative of the banking industry of each G-10 country, as some countries are only represented by very small banks.
Therefore, the main contribution of this study is to extend the empirical literature on the effects of the Basel Accord using a simultaneous-equations model for seven different countries along with a representative data set, the construction of which is detailed in the next section.
Data sources and description
Sources
Data were obtained from Bankscope, a database of bank account figures which is a joint product of Fitch Ratings and Bureau Van Dijk, a major rating agency and a publisher of financial databases on CD-ROM, respectively. Consistent with most studies on the impact of the Basel requirements, I chose to restrict the sample to commercial banks over the 1988-95 period. 
Methodology
All the variables used in this study were available on Bankscope, except the credit risk ratio of banks. Therefore, capital adequacy ratios (CAR), capital levels (K) and total assets (A)
were extracted from the database in order to compute the credit risk ratio (RISK) using the following formulas:
Equation [6] can be computed in two different ways, either using tier 1 data (i.e., K = tier 1 capital and CAR = tier 1 ratio) or using total capital data (i.e., K = total capital and CAR = total capital ratio). Obviously, both methods yield the same value for risk-weighted assets. In order to check for consistency of the results, I computed the credit risk ratio using both methods except for Japanese banks, which generally do not report their total capital.
Sample Statistics
Using the data from Bankscope, I constructed an unbalanced panel containing 586 commercial banks from seven G-10 countries with assets of more than $ 100 million during the period 1988-95. Banks that did not report their total capital ratio, their tier 1 ratio or their credit risk ratio for at least 2 consecutive years were omitted from the data set. Also, banks with a capital ratio above 50% or a credit risk ratio above 200% were treated as outliers and excluded from the sample.
(insert Table 2 here)
7 Data on capital adequacy are not available for years prior to 1988, preventing any comparison with the pre-Basel period. The choice of 1995 is somewhat arbitrary but quite standard given that most studies on the impact of the Basel Accord focus on the first half of the 1990s. In the case of the US, Flannery and Rangan (2002) have shown that none of the 100 largest banking firms appears to have been constrained by regulatory capital requirements since 1995.
The second column of Table 2 shows the distribution of banks by country. Unfortunately, Bankscope does not contain data on the capital levels of Belgian, Dutch, Luxembourg, German and Swiss commercial banks over the period of interest, which prevents the computation of their risk-weighted assets using equation [6] . This explains why the analysis is limited to the remaining seven G-10 countries. Unsurprisingly, Japanese and US banking institutions constitute the vast majority of the sample.
The remainder of Table 2 indicates that the sample is in fact quite representative of each national banking sector. With the exception of the UK, the data set includes at least 7 of the 10 biggest commercial banks (in terms of assets) of each country. Moreover, the sum of sample banks' assets almost always exceeds half of the total national banking assets.
(insert Table 3 here) First, the tier 1 ratio and the total capital ratio of all countries are far above their minimum required levels of 4% and 8%, respectively. Moreover, both series are upward trending across the years 1988-93, with no significant increase afterwards. Two groups of countries coexist in the sample: those with relatively low capital adequacy ratios throughout the whole period (Canada, France and Japan) and those that exhibit higher figures for both regulatory ratios (Italy, Sweden, the UK and the US).
Second, with respect to credit risk, some countries (Canada, the UK and possibly the US) appear to have experienced a decrease in their banking portfolio risk whereas others (France, Italy, Japan and Sweden) have seen their credit risk ratio remaining relatively constant. Once again, the sample can be divided into two groups of countries: those with an average credit risk ratio varying between 50% and 60% (France, Italy, Sweden and perhaps the UK) and those with a credit risk ratio equal or higher than 70% (Canada, Japan and the US). At first glance, it might be tempting to attribute the higher credit risk ratio of these 3 countries to their pre-1988 capital adequacy rules. Indeed, until the Basel guidelines were adopted, simple gearing ratios were in force in Canada, Japan and the US (Pecchioli, 1987) , which may account for their historically higher level of credit risk. But then, the 1988 Accord should have led to a decrease in the credit risk ratio of these countries as risk-based standards take into account the composition of a bank's portfolio when assessing capital charges. However, On the whole, Table 3 suggests that the seven G-10 countries have raised their capital adequacy ratios during the 1988-93 period whereas no specific trend could be found in the credit risk series. Table 4 presents further descriptive statistics on the relationship between capital and risk, by decomposing the average annual growth rate of the total capital ratio and of the tier 1 ratio into three terms, as in equation [5] .
(insert Table 4 here)
As can be seen from Table 4 , the growth rate of both ratios over the sample years is roughly similar and is mainly driven by a rise in capital levels, which offsets the rise in total assets.
The growth rate of the credit risk ratio is close to zero for all countries except Canada, Sweden and the UK. However, Tables 3 and 4 do not tell us whether ∆CAR and ∆RISK are related, nor whether the increase in capital adequacy ratios that took place between 1988 and 1993 was due to the introduction of capital adequacy rules. Indeed, it could be the case that banks that were not part of the Basel Accord also decreased their leverage.
(insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 here) Figure 1 shows that a rise in the equity to asset ratio 9 was not only experienced by G-10 banks at the beginning of the 1990s, but also by non G-10 banks and even by banks from countries where capital adequacy rules were not put in place before 1993. 10 In a similar way, Figure 2 indicates that the reliance of these three groups of banks on subordinated debt 11 -a key component of tier 2 capital -was roughly similar throughout the period surveyed.
Thus, determining whether the Basel agreement caused changes in capital and risk ratios of G-10 banks and whether these changes were related requires a more complex econometric analysis than just looking at descriptive statistics. The following section sets up a model that aims at assessing the empirical determinants of observed changes in capital and risk ratios with a particular emphasis on the role played by capital adequacy rules.
The model
In order to acknowledge that capital and risk decisions are determined together, I extend the simultaneous equation model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) to a multi-country setting. In this model, observed changes in banks' capital and credit risk ratios consist of two components, a discretionary adjustment and a change caused by factors exogenous to the bank:
where ∆CAR i,t and ∆RISK i,t are the observed changes in capital and risk ratios, respectively, for bank i in period t. The
CAR and RISK ∆ ∆ variables represent discretionary adjustments in capital and risk, and E i,t and S i,t are exogenously-determined factors.
Following Shrieves and Dahl, I model the discretionary changes in capital and risk using a partial adjustment framework such that:
where * * i,t i,t CAR and RISK are the target capital and risk ratios, respectively. Thus, the discretionary changes in capital and risk for bank i are proportional to the difference between the target ratio and the (observed) ratio in period t-1.
Substituting equations [10] and [11] into equations [8] and [9]
, the changes in capital and risk can now be written as:
This means that observed changes in capital and risk in period t are a function of the target capital and risk ratios, the lagged capital and risk ratios, and any random shocks. Due to the low number of observations for most of the sample countries, I decided to pool cross-country data to estimate this system of equations.
Although the target capital and risk ratios of a bank are not observable, they are assumed to depend on some set of observable variables describing the bank's financial condition and the state of the economy in each country. The variables that I use to approximate the target capital ratio (CAR*) are the size of the bank (SIZE), a measure of its liquidity (LOANS), a profitability indicator (ROA), changes in the risk ratio (∆RISK), country dummies, the degree of regulatory pressure (REG) interacted with country dummies, and year dummies (YEAR).
The variables used to proxy the target credit risk ratio (RISK*) are the size of the bank (SIZE), a measure of its liquidity (LOANS), a measure of asset quality (LLOSS), changes in the capital ratio (∆CAR), country dummies, the degree of regulatory pressure (REG) interacted with country dummies, and year dummies (YEAR).
The explanatory variables can thus be divided into bank-specific and country-specific factors plus year dummies.
Bank-specific variables
All the variables presented here have been used in the studies listed Table 1 with the exception of the LOANS variable.
SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. It is included as a control variable because large banks have an easier access to equity capital markets and are thus expected to have lower capital ratios than smaller banks. In addition, large banks carry out a wider range of activities, which should increase their ability to diversify their portfolio hence to decrease their credit risk. The variable LOANS, defined as the percentage of total assets tied up in loans, is included in the system of equations as a measure of the riskiness of the bank. As
higher LOANS values correspond to lower investment in non earning assets, they should lead to higher portfolio risk and a greater need for capital. Therefore, the impact of LOANS on capital ratios will be positive if capital levels increase by more than what is necessary to compensate the increase in the credit risk ratio (cf. equation [5] ). Consistent with previous studies, the return on assets, ROA, is included in equation [12] as profitable banks may prefer to increase capital through retained earnings rather than through equity issues in the presence of asymmetric information in capital markets. Loan loss provisions as a percentage of total assets, LLOSS, are included in equation [13] as they represent funds that banks set aside to cover bad loans. Loan loss provisions are deducted from outstanding loans and should therefore lead to a decrease in risk-weighted assets. As a consequence, they are expected to have a negative impact on the credit risk ratio.
Finally, the analysis in section 2 indicates that banks' capital and risk choices are interdependent, which suggests the inclusion of ∆CAR in equation [13] and of ∆RISK in equation [12] . The sign of the relationship between these two variables is not clear a priori. A positive sign would mean that G-10 banks increased their capital buffer and their credit risk simultaneously, a result consistent with the unintended effects of more stringent capital requirements suggested by the literature reviewed in section 2.1. This would also imply that banks rely on an increase in capital levels and / or a decrease in total assets to increase their capital adequacy ratios. On the other hand, a negative relationship between changes in capital and risk ratios would indicate that higher capital ratios did not give banks greater incentives to increase credit risk, leading to an unambiguous decrease in the probability of bankruptcy at the G-10 level.
Country-specific variables
Country fixed-effects are included in the model in order to account for factors that are not reflected by the set of bank-specific variables, such as national differences in capital preferences and risk-aversion. The country dummies are also assumed to capture the extent to which national variants of the Basel Accord had an impact on capital and risk. Some countries that were part of the 1988 agreement have indeed supplemented the original guidelines with additional requirements such as higher capital thresholds or new regulatory ratios over the period studied.
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Of greater interest here is the regulatory pressure variable (REG), which is interacted with a second set of country dummies. This variable is meant to capture the impact of the Basel Accord across the G-10 as it describes the behavior of the banks that fell short of the regulatory standards. More precisely, the regulatory pressure variable used in this study emphasizes two aspects. First, the level below which a bank should be regarded as undercapitalized and hence influenced by capital adequacy rules. Second, the size of the gap between a bank's capital ratio and this level, hence the magnitude of regulatory pressure experienced by the bank. With the exception of Jacques and Nigro (1997) , the papers listed in Table 1 focus on the first aspect and neglect the second one. That is, they create a simple dummy variable, which is equal to one when capital adequacy ratios are below some threshold level and zero otherwise. The threshold level is the minimum regulatory ratio (cf.
equations [2] and [3]) or the minimum plus some bank-specific quantity.
The need to take into account the second characteristic of supervisory pressure -i.e., a measure of how far banks are from the threshold -suggests the use of the following regulatory pressure variable: REG= THR -CAR if CAR < THR 0 otherwise [14] where THR represents the threshold level.
Thus, supervisory pressure is positive whenever CAR < THR, but decreasing as CAR approaches THR from below. Banks with a CAR above THR are considered to be unaffected by capital adequacy regulation. Of course, a proper threshold value still needs to be chosen.
For this purpose, I use Table 5 , which lists the number of banks' observations experiencing positive regulatory pressure for different values of THR (from now on, I use the term "undercapitalized" to describe these observations).
(insert Table 5 here)
As shown in Panels A and B, the percentage of banks' observations that can be regarded as undercapitalized is very low when the threshold is first set to the interim standards and then to the definitive standards (Panel A) or directly to the latter standards (Panel B). Although this result seems to support the widespread idea that banks were not affected by the Basel standards, it could be the case that lower requirements would have induced banks to hold less capital and that banks actually constructed a buffer above the regulatory minimum for precautionary and / or reputational reasons. Panels C to E illustrate this possibility by setting the threshold value for the total capital ratio and for the tier 1 ratio to the regulatory minimum augmented by one standard deviation of the bank's own capital ratio (Panel C), to 9% and 4.5% (Panel D) and finally to 10% and 5% (Panel E), respectively. Consequently, the percentage of undercapitalized observations based on the total capital ratio increases to roughly 18% in Panels C and D and to 34% in Panel E whereas the percentage of observations that do not meet the different threshold values for the tier 1 ratio remains systematically below 8%. Thus, a first finding that emerges from Table 5 is that G-10 banks were more constrained by their total capital ratio than by their tier 1 ratio over the 1988-94 period. A second result is that, whatever the value taken by THR, the UK and the US always have the lowest percentages of banks with CAR < THR. This is probably due to the fact that most observations for both countries are from the years 1992-1995, when banks were strictly obliged to obey the regulatory requirements.
Looking at the percentages of undercapitalized observations and their dispersion across countries, it seems appropriate to consider two different threshold levels: the one set in Panel To sum up, I measure regulatory pressure using equation [14] , where THR alternatively takes two values: the minimum requirement and the minimum requirement plus one bank-specific standard deviation. Note that the use of the regulatory pressure variable to capture the impact of the Basel Accord faces one important criticism, namely that the behavior of banks below the threshold is likely to be influenced by other factors than capital requirements, including market pressure coming from peer banks, private investors and even rating agencies. Thus, it may be hard to disentangle the effects of the Basel Accord from increased market discipline (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999). However, one could reasonably argue that market pressure is ultimately driven by the prevailing capital adequacy rules, and hence, that the REG variable is appropriate to capture the impact of the Basel standards on banks' behavior.
13 I have looked at several ways to increase this number. For instance, by taking into account the additional requirements regarding tier 2 capital (cf. equation [4] ) or the amount of general loan-loss reserves and subordinated debt eligible for inclusion in tier 2 capital (cf. Appendix 1). Unfortunately, none of the sample banks violates equation [4] whereas the composition of tier 2 capital is not disclosed in Bankscope.
Year dummy variables (YEAR)
Dummy variables for each year of the reference period -except 1989 in order to avoid perfect collinearity -are added to the specification to take account of macroeconomic shocks (e.g. changes in the volume or in the structure of loans demand) that can affect banks' capital and credit risk ratios.
Specification
On the basis of the variables selected to explain target capital and risk ratios, the model where b, c, g and h are the country dummy variables and j is a country index ε i,t and ν i,t are disturbance terms
The coefficients of particular interest in this system of equations are c j and h j , which represent, for country j, the impact of regulatory pressure on observed changes in capital and risk, respectively, and a 4 and f 4 that test the relationship between changes in capital and risk ratios at the G-10 level.
Results
Since the right-hand side of both ∆CAR and ∆RISK includes an endogenous variable, the estimation of the system formed by equations [15] Tables 6 and 7 present the results for the system based on the total capital ratio and on the tier 1 ratio, respectively.
The first two columns of each table show the results when THR is set to the minimum regulatory requirement, while the remaining two columns present the results when THR is defined as the minimum requirement plus one standard deviation of the bank's own capital ratio. A quick examination of both tables reveals that most of the explanatory variables are statistically significant 15 in at least one of the regressions.
The time dummies are all positive and significant in the ∆CAR equations of Table 6 , which indicates that target total capital ratios were higher over the period 1990-1995 than in 1989.
The magnitude of the year dummies implies that the biggest increase in total capital ratios across the seven countries took place in 1992 (dummy 1992 -dummy 1991 ≅ +1.2%). This result is logical since the definitive Basel standards had to be implemented by the end of December 1992. On the contrary, the time dummies included in the ∆CAR equations of Table 7 are mostly insignificant, which suggests that target tier 1 ratios were relatively constant across years. These results echo Table 5 , which showed that banks had more difficulties in meeting the minimum requirement for the total capital ratio than the minimum requirement for the tier 1 ratio. The time dummies included in the ∆RISK equations are only negatively significant in Table 7 , providing mixed support for the hypothesis that target risk ratios were lower in the first half of the 1990s than in 1989.
Next, the country dummy variables, used alone, capture the extent to which target capital and risk ratios differed across countries over 1989-95. The country dummies are essentially significant in the ∆CAR equations, where their magnitude is roughly identical for each country. This result suggests that most banks across the G-10 had the same target capital ratios in mind and that the national variants of the Basel Accord did not bring major changes to it. Indeed, Canada is probably the first country to have seriously departed from the 1988 agreement by requesting its banks to hold a minimum tier 1 ratio of 7% and a minimum total capital ratio of 10% but only recently, in 1999. In the regressions where THR is set to the minimum regulatory requirement, an F-test rejected the null hypothesis that the target capital ratio of Swedish banks was of the same order of magnitude as that of other G-10 banks. The higher magnitude of the dummy variable for Sweden is more than probably due to the 14 However, 3SLS may be sensitive to misspecification or measurement error. This suggests comparison with 2SLS estimates as a specification check. Estimation of equations [15] and [16] using 2SLS produces essentially the same results. 15 Throughout the paper, "significance" refers to a level of confidence of 95% and "marginal significance" to a level of confidence of 90%.
aftermath of the banking crisis experienced by this country, with banks forced to recapitalize heavily, leading them to overshoot the target induced by Basel.
Before analyzing the regulatory pressure brought about by the Basel Accord, I briefly discuss the sign of some bank-specific variables (lower panel of Tables 6 and 7 ). The parameter estimates on lagged capital and risk ratios are negative and significant in both tables, with values between -0.214 and -0.152. This result indicates that banks were only slowly adjusting their capital and risk ratios to desired levels in the first half of the 1990s. Bank size (SIZE) has a negative impact on bank capital ratios and a positive impact on the credit risk ratio. Possible interpretations are that large banks have easier access to capital markets and can therefore operate with lower amounts of capital or that they feel less pressure to increase their capital ratio because of a "too-big-to-fail" effect. A larger size also allows a greater diversification to mitigate the credit risk exposure. As hypothesized, loans as a percentage of total assets (LOANS) are a good proxy of the target risk profile of a bank as they always increase the credit risk ratio significantly. Their impact on capital ratios is negative, which suggests that capital levels rise by less than what is necessary to compensate the increase in risk. The return on assets (ROA) was found to have a positive effect on banks' capital ratios, a result consistent with the hypothesis that banks with higher earnings can retain more capital.
Finally, loan loss provisions as a percentage of total assets (LLOSS) had no effect on target risk ratios overall.
More importantly, Tables 6 and 7 provide some insights on the behavior of banks experiencing regulatory pressure and on the overall relationship between ∆CAR and ∆RISK.
Hereunder, I focus on the results obtained by setting THR to the minimum regulatory requirement plus one bank-specific standard deviation, i.e. on the last two columns of each table. Regressions with THR equal to the regulatory minimum include too few undercapitalized observations and may therefore display unreliable estimates or no estimates at all for the regulatory pressure variables (see the first two columns of Table 7 ).
Impact of the Basel Accord on bank capital ratios
In Table 6 , banks put under regulatory pressure because they were below the 8% requirement plus one standard deviation increased their total capital ratio significantly in four countries:
Canada, Japan, Sweden and the US. 16 It is well-known that one of the hidden goals of the Basel Accord was to create a level playing field by eliminating the funding-cost advantage 16 Interpreting the magnitude of the regulatory pressure variable (REG) interacted with country dummies is not possible due to its definition (see equation [14] ).
enjoyed by Japanese banks which operated with significantly lower capital to asset ratio compared to their competitors in other G-10 countries (Wagster, 1996) . Results in Table 6 show that the Basel Accord was quite effective in raising the total capital ratio of undercapitalized Japanese institutions, which tends to indicate that part of this competitive advantage was reduced. In France and in the UK, some banks (e.g. Banque Paribas or Lloyds Bank plc) did not raise their total capital ratio in the first years of the Basel implementation process, which probably accounts for the fact that the regulatory pressure variable is found to be insignificant for both countries. 17 The fact that French banks were slow in meeting the Basel requirements is not surprising given that they had previously only been subject to a minimum total capital ratio of 5%. Surprisingly, I found that Italian banks within one standard deviation of the regulatory minimum actually decreased their total capital ratio even though only marginally significantly. Two things might explain this result. First, Italian banks belonging to a banking group are allowed to have a capital ratio as low as 7% provided that the 8% requirement is respected for the group as a whole. Second, some troubled banking institutions not only fell below the regulatory threshold, but also saw their capital position deteriorate dramatically over the period studied. For instance, the total capital ratio of Banco di Napoli, the seventh biggest Italian bank in terms of assets, was down from 8.46% in 1992 to 1.74% in 1995. These banks were eventually recapitalized.
Examining the coefficients on the regulatory pressure variable in the capital equation of Table 7 indicates that undercapitalized banks showed the same response to the Basel Accord in their tier 1 ratio than in their total capital ratio, except in Canada and in Japan for which the coefficients are non significant. The result for Japan is consistent with several papers 18 which show that undercapitalized Japanese banks tended to issue more subordinated debts (an increase in tier 2 capital, hence in total capital), while leaving their tier 1 capital relatively unchanged. Finally, it should be mentioned that the regulatory pressure variable has a positive and significant impact on both capital adequacy ratios when it is not interacted with country dummies.
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Impact of the Basel Accord on bank portfolio risk
Regarding the impact of the Basel standards on portfolio risk, the parameter estimates for the regulatory pressure variable show little significance, except in Table 6 where they are positive and significant for Canada, Sweden and Japan, but only marginally in the latter case. Thus, the findings weakly support the hypothesis that undercapitalized banks in these three countries were increasing risk in response to the Basel agreement between 1988 and 1995.
Moreover, the regulatory pressure variable is found to be insignificant when not interacted with country dummies, 19 suggesting that capital requirements did not increase credit risktaking at the G-10 level. This result contradicts earlier findings by Koehn and Santomero (1980) and others, who argue that more stringent bank capital regulation will cause a utility maximizing bank to increase asset risk and may, as a result, increase the probability of bank failure.
Overall relationship between changes in capital and risk ratios
Finally, a robust finding emerges from Tables 6 and 7 , namely the negative relationship between changes in capital and risk ratios over 1988-95. Conditioning on other variables, an increase in the credit risk ratio of 1% decreases the total capital ratio by only 0.07% and the tier 1 ratio by a mere 0.05%, suggesting that G-10 banks almost offset any increase in risk with an increase in capital and / or a decrease in total assets. Looking at the "risk" equations, a rise of 1% in both capital ratios is associated with a similar decrease in the credit risk ratio.
This means that, conditioning on other variables, higher capital ratios led to a decrease in portfolio risk at the G-10 level during the 1988-95 period. The existence of a negative relationship between changes in capital ratios and credit risk contrasts with the empirical studies reviewed in section 2.3, which generally find that these changes are either somewhat positively related or not related at all (see the last column of Table 1 ). This result also strongly rejects various theories providing a rationale for a positive relationship between changes in capital and risk, including the "bankruptcy cost avoidance" theory and the "managerial risk aversion" theory (see Shrieves and Dahl, 1992) .
Conclusion
This paper documents the behavior of banks from seven G-10 countries toward capital and risk between 1988 and 1995 by using a modified version of the model developed by Shrieves and Dahl (1992) . Prior research, both at the theoretical and empirical levels, indicates that banks may well respond to an increase in capital requirements by a corresponding increase in the credit risk of their portfolio.
The evidence presented here shows that G-10 banks within one standard deviation of the minimum regulatory capital requirement tended to increase their capital adequacy ratios, except in France and in Italy. This finding indicates that regulatory pressure, i.e., the degree to which banks are urged to raise their capital ratios by the prudential authorities, was generally effective in raising the capital buffer of banks across the G-10. Moreover, regulatory pressure only marginally raised the credit risk of banks, a result suggesting that banks that had to raise their capital ratios drastically did not in general engage in riskier activities. In addition, the tendency toward higher capital ratios, which characterizes G-10 banks during the 1988-95
period, was shown to have gone hand in hand with a decrease in credit risk. All in all, the evidence presented here indicates that the 1988 Basel Accord did not lead banks to engage in riskier activities, while providing them with a higher capital buffer against insolvency. These findings have important policy implications for regulators as they suggest that the use of risk buckets to assess and limit credit risk-taking is likely to produce the desired effect. This approach to portfolio risk is currently being refined under the "standardized approach" of the New Basel Accord, which is likely to be adopted by many small banks that do not have the resources to use one of the more advanced "internal ratings-based approaches".
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Two caveats are in order, however. First, as pointed out by Jones (2000) , banks may attempt to arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk and regulatory requirements. This can be done either by boosting capital ratios through "cosmetic arrangements" or by exploiting shortcomings in the measure of risk through "regulatory capital arbitrage", both methods allowing banks to misreport their effective capital ratios and / or credit risk. Although the lack of data prevents measuring the extent to which these techniques were used by banks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 1999), this points out that risk-weighted assets as defined by the 1988 Basel standards may not fully reflect the actual risk of a bank's portfolio.
Second, the paper analyzes portfolio risk in isolation from other types of risks, like market risk or interest rate risk. It could be the case that banks chose not to modify their credit risk to comply with the Basel guidelines, while increasing their interest or market exposure.
However, evidence on the existence of such a trade-off is scarce, even if it is due to a lack of data. 21 Moreover, the fact that credit risk is still the biggest risk faced by banks strengthens confidence in the conclusion that G-10 banks did not become riskier in the first half of the 1990s. 20 Under the "standardized approach", corporate exposures are now assigned to five risk buckets (0%, 20%, 50%, 100% and 150%) according to the nature of the claim and the assessment of external agencies, while retail exposures receive a 75% risk weight. The "internal ratings-based approaches" allow banks to determine their own risk weights through the combination of their quantitative inputs and formulas specified by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 21 Typically, estimating interest-risk exposure requires data on the duration of banks' assets. This information is almost impossible to obtain on a standardized cross-country basis. In the case of the US, Allen et al. (1996) provide some evidence that substitution of unpriced interest rate risk for priced credit risk did occur. However, they do not allow for other features of banks' books, which makes their results difficult to interpret. 2,017 t statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Subordinated Debt / Total Assets (%) G-10 banks Non G-10 banks Banks not reporting a CAR before 1993
Source: Bankscope, Update 77 (December 1996) 
